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Abstract 
Research in moral education demonstrates the pattern referred to as happy 
victimising (HV) does not emerge only among children. Adults also transgress 
moral rules and might feel good doing so; however, research reveals the HV 
pattern emergence is context specific. In contrast to findings among young 
children in whom the HV pattern was interpreted as a lack of motivation and thus 
a developmental stage, it is an open question as to what happy victimising in 
adulthood means and how such patterns affect intentions as an important step 
towards action. This paper offers an action-theoretical approach, allowing for 
reconstruction of the process of intention formation, as well as a systematic 
discussion of results from two separate lines of research: (1) research on patterns 
of moral decision-making, such as the HV, and (2) research on moral 
disengagement. Additionally, a survey study provides insights into what 
intentions, emotion attributions, and moral disengagement strategies adults 
display in situations of low moral intensity, and whether they indicate consistent 
or contradictory patterns across situations. Results indicate intra-personal 
consistency regarding patterns of moral decision-making, but also show there 
are participants who vary these patterns across situations. Moral disengagement 
strategies were shown to have context-specific use, at least in regard to their 
subcategories. Regarding education, this study encourages not only a focus on 
strengthening the moral self or autonomous moral judgement but also on paying 
attention to actions and person-situation interactions. This might be useful to 
implement environments that support reduced application of moral 
disengagement strategies. 
Keywords: moral transgression, Happy Victimizer, moral acting, moral 
disengagement 
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1. Introduction 
The frequency of economic scandals, such as Diesel-gate, tax evasion, corruption, fraud, or 
fake-shops for breathing masks during the COVID-19 pandemic indicates that even people who seem 
to be friendly and empathic at first glance may transgress moral rules almost as frequently as others, 
depending on the situation, context, or one’s role. At least occasionally, people do not follow 
conventional rules, moral standards, or principles and, simultaneously, ignore others’ perspectives in 
favour of fulfilling their own or their companies’ needs. While this may lead to the assumption that 
moral transgression and self-centeredness are a basic human phenomenona that emerge in adulthood, 
research also shows that moral education can be successful in developing socio-moral competencies 
(e.g., Lind, 2019; Weinberger & Frewein, 2019) and creating a moral atmosphere. Further, fostering 
empathy and social perspective-taking helps to increase prosocial behaviour (Bandura, 2016; Eisenberg, 
Fabes, & Spinrad, 2007; Malti et al., 2016). From an educational perspective, it seems important to keep 
searching for effective ways to develop the competencies adults need to effectively deal with morally 
relevant situations in their everyday (working) lives. In routine as well as odd situations, people have to 
balance their own interests with those of others. Thus, to discuss aims of moral education across the 
lifespan, results of empirical research should be considered that contribute to explaining how people act, 
what personal and situational factors determine whether someone acts in line with or contradictory to 
moral standards, and how such competencies can be developed up to adulthood and beyond. 
Research on moral psychology shows that agents simultaneously know about moral rules and 
attribute positive emotions in cases of transgression. This pattern of ethical decision-making, here called 
‘happy victimising’, was initially detected among children approximately four years old; however, 
recent research has shown that this pattern also emerges among adolescents and adults (e.g., Heinrichs, 
Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Latzko, Minnameier, & Döring, this issue; Heinrichs, Minnameier, Latzko & 
Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 2015; Nunner-Winkler, 2007; 2013; Minnameier, Heinrichs, & Kirschbaum, 
2016; Minnameier & Schmidt, 2013). Furthermore, there is evidence of different manifestations of 
ethical decision-making and emotion attributions, such as the patterns of 
• ‘happy victimizing’ (HV; transgressing moral rules, attributing positive emotions),  
• ‘unhappy victimizing’ (UV; transgressing moral rules, attributing negative emotions),  
• ‘happy moralizing’ (HM; obeying moral rules, attributing positive emotions), and  
• ‘unhappy moralizing’ (UM; obeying moral rules, attributing negative emotions)  
These patterns are at least applied in economically relevant situations, and emerge to varying 
extents, depending on the measurement methods used (Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger & Latzko,  this issue). 
They also vary intra-personally across situations, and can influence individual actions (Döring, 2013; 
Gasser, Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Latzko, & Malti, 2013). Thus, these patterns of ethical decision-
making might contribute to explaining adults’ deviant behaviours within different social, private, and 
work-related contexts. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence and theoretical foundations on 
how internal patterns of decision-making, moral judgments, and emotion attributions can be modelled 
to determine the processes of action in morally (and economically) relevant situations. This is important 
to study across different developmental stages; however, this article focuses on adults’ patterns of moral 
decision-making and emotion attributions as indicators of the valence of intentions, and thus as 
predictors for actions.  
To bridge the gap between judgment and action, we applied the process model of judging and 
acting (Heinrichs, 2005). This model provides a theoretical framework to gain deeper insight into 
relevant situational and individual determinants of action processes. This model further offers a detailed 
reconstruction of the action formation process, from interpreting a perceived situation to implementing 
a behaviour. Particularly, it provides ideas on relevant steps in the first phase of acting, which concludes 
with intention formation. Referring to this process model, one obstacle to forming a high-valence 
intention is a lack of self-commitment to one’s preferred way of behaving. This lack may often become 
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apparent in situations with conflicting values or goals, or when an individual perceives ambivalence in 
cognitive or emotional states, and often appears in UV and UM patterns.  
To overcome this lack of commitment and form a high-valence intention, the process model 
posits that people use cognitive control strategies (Heinrichs, 2005). To specify what cognitive control 
strategies might be helpful in morally relevant situations where the agent has to choose between 
transgressing against or obeying a moral rule, it is necessary to refer to further research. Therefore, we 
refer to Bandura`s concept of ‘moral disengagement’ strategies (MDS; Bandura, 1990, 2016). Bandura 
and colleagues suggest (volitional) control strategies, and indicate that these strategies deactivate self-
sanctions that would normally support moral action. Individuals using MDS can thus make a choice 
other than the ‘moral’ course of action, as these self-regulation strategies enable agents to reach a state 
of emotional well-being while causing negative (severe) consequences for others (Osofsky, Bandura, & 
Zimbardo, 2005). In specifying the role of MDS in the process of forming an intention, however, it 
remains questionable whether and to what extent people really apply MDS in certain situations; when 
they decide for or against a moral transgression; and whether they feel committed to choosing 
‘victimising’ or ‘moral behaviours’. Focusing on MDS in particular situations seems important, as moral 
reasoning, moral emotions, and patterns of moral decision-making vary intra-personally across 
situations, and can therefore be considered results of person-situation interactions.  
Therefore, it might be fruitful to study how people use MDS within the context of moral 
transgressions. Bandura and colleagues mainly studied MDS as individual tendencies across situations; 
thus, they looked for intra-personal consistency. Contrastingly, we focused on the application of MDS 
in particular situations during the action process, particularly during the first step towards acting: the 
sub-process of forming an intention. We aimed to provide deeper insights into whether individuals who 
intend to make moral transgressions (UV, HV) also apply MDS. If they use MDS in terms of (moral) 
reasoning for their preferences, in line with the process model, it could be assumed that MDS might 
have functioned during the process of forming intentions towards a preference of moral transgression, 
increasing the level of commitment, and the probability of acting in line with one’s intention.  
Thus, this paper provides theoretical ideas and the first empirical data on the HV pattern in 
adulthood, exploring MDS use in morally relevant situations. Theoretically, the presented study refers 
to an action-based approach (Heinrichs, 2005) that allows for the presentation of theoretical ideas on 
how patterns of moral decision-making and emotion attributions (HV, UV, HM, UM), as well as MDS, 
may affect intentions in morally relevant situations, and specifically in situations that provoke decisions 
to follow or break a moral rule. The results of this questionnaire study among students can provide 
insight in differences in intentions, attributed emotions, and frequency, as well as qualities and intra-
personal differences, of MDS use across morally relevant situations in a work-related context.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.1 provides basic information on the state of 
research in terms of empirical findings on patterns of moral decision-making among adults. In this 
context, a rationale is provided for why this study focuses on situations of low moral intensity that are 
assumed to provoke victimisation at a higher rate than dilemmas and that are omnipresent in everyday 
(working) life. Section 2.2 explicates basic assumptions of an action-theoretical approach to reconstruct 
patterns of moral decision-making as potential intentions to act in morally relevant situations. We 
therefore chose situations in consumer and business contexts, as adolescents and adults are familiar with 
these situations in everyday or working life. Furthermore, such situations might have the potential to 
elucidate inner conflicts related to transgressing against moral rules in favour of economic or personal 
interests. Section 2.3 explains theoretical foundations and empirical findings related to MDS and posits 
that MDS may represent cognitive strategies that can be linked to intentions to obey or transgress against 
a moral rule. Based on this theoretical foundation, a survey study was conducted to explore whether and 
to what extent students apply patterns of moral decision-making and emotion attributions across 
situations, as well as whether and to what extent students use MDS when choosing whether to victimise 
others (Sections 3 and 4). Finally, implications for further research on decision-making, behaviour, and 
disengagement in morally relevant situations and implications for moral education are discussed 
(Section 5). 
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2. Theory 
2.1 Happy Victimising in Adulthood 
The developmental psychologists Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) coined the term ‘Happy 
Victimizer Phenomenon’, and explained it as a lack of moral motivation at an early stage of moral 
development. As the rate of people displaying this ‘Happy Victimizer Phenomenon’ decreases in later 
age groups (from eight years onwards), it was assumed that this pattern is caused by the absence of a 
link between cognition and emotion, and therefore might be overcome during later stages of moral 
development (Krettenauer, Malti, & Sokol, 2008; Nunner-Winkler, 1993). However, further studies 
revealed that such patterns also emerged to a considerable extent in adolescence (Döring, 2013; 
Heinrichs et al.,  this issue) and even in adulthood (Heinrichs et al., 2015; Nunner-Winkler, 2007; 2013; 
Minnameier, Heinrichs, & Kirschbaum, 2016; Minnameier & Schmidt, 2013).  
However, empirical studies have revealed that these patterns of moral decision-making in 
adulthood do not characterise a person-specific method of moral judgment, applied consistently across 
situations, with hardly any exceptions, as was assumed in the ‘Happy Victimizer Phenomenon’ of early 
childhood. Moreover, in adulthood, these patterns are described as varying intra-personally across 
situations, to an extent that had not been expected based on previous theoretical assumptions. 
Simultaneously, recent findings indicate a significant small or medium effect that still points to personal 
preferences towards patterns of moral decision-making (Heinrichs, et al., this issue; Malti & 
Krettenauer, 2013). Thus, patterns of moral decision-making seem to result from person-situation 
interaction, but are more affected by situational determinants than developmental psychology had 
assumed. Moreover, empirical research in moral and developmental psychology has previously 
confirmed that the proportion of moral decisions reflecting the HV pattern varies depending on 
situational cues, particularly on the degree of the moral conflict, or whether people are encouraged to 
make judgments using a self- or others’ perspective (Keller, Lourenço, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003; 
Nunner-Winkler, 2013; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013). However, these situational variations were mostly 
discussed as being dependent on measurement methods (Heinrichs et al., 2015; this issue; Gutzwiller-
Helfenfinger & Latzko, this issue; Nunner-Winkler, 2013).  
Following empirical results on intra-personal variations in moral decision-making, in this paper, 
we do not use the term ‘Happy Victimizer Phenomenon’, as previously described as emerging in earlier 
stages of childhood development. Moreover, we differentiate ‘patterns’ of moral decision-making and 
emotion attributions (see above; Heinrichs et al., this issue). It has been assumed that HV—as well as 
UV, HM, and UM—displays intra-personal variations in moral decision-making and managing moral 
emotions across situations. However, until now, there has been no satisfying empirical evidence 
supporting this, but rather a need for research on the personal and situational determinants that trigger 
the use or intra-personal change in these patterns. Furthermore, there is also a lack of theoretical 
approaches to explain HV in adulthood. 
However, there is evidence that these patterns are important insofar as they are linked to 
individual actions. Empirical findings confirm that HV is a relevant pattern in the context of bullying 
(Gasser et al., 2013), and characterises bullies or bully victims. Moreover, the HV pattern is related to 
deviant adolescent behaviour (Döring, 2013). Research on counterproductive behaviour in 
organisational contexts indicates the relevance of individual moral values, judgments, and moral 
sensibility (Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012). Thus, patterns of moral decision-making, 
such as HV, UV, HM, and UM, might further contribute to explaining deviant behaviours among adults, 
within different social, private, and work-related contexts. Therefore, they may also be relevant from 
the perspectives of moral education, vocational education, human resource development, and 
organisational behaviour. 
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2.2 An Action-based Approach to Moral Decision-making 
This paper primarily contributes to theoretical progress in explaining determinants of the action 
process in morally relevant situations and, in particular, determinants of moral intentions. Therefore, 
two lines of research are linked to each other: research on patterns of moral decision-making, like the 
HV pattern, and research on MDS. The process model of acting (Heinrichs, 2005) functions as a 
theoretical framework which can be used to reconstruct and specify the action processes, from 
constituting a situation to forming an intention, implementation, conduct, and evaluation. This model 
was developed as a theoretical framework integrating Esser’s (1996) social psychological model of 
‘definition of the situation’ and Heckhausen’s Rubikon model (Gollwitzer, 1996; Heckhausen, 
Gollwitzer, & Weinert, 1987), and is based on a set of assumptions. It allows for analysing the 
interaction between personal and situational determinants on the way from perceiving selected 
situational cues to forming an intention and behaviour (see Figure 1). Thus, in line with approaches to 
moral judgment and action in the post-Kohlbergian tradition, it does not focus on the development of 
personal determinants, but points to applying patterns of decision-making, reasoning, or acting to 
morally relevant situations and contexts (Krebs & Denton, 2005; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005; for a 
summary, see also Heinrichs, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 1. The Process Model of Acting: From Constituting a Situation to Forming an Intention 
(Heinrichs, 2005) 
 
The model’s basic assumptions are as follows (Heinrichs, 2005):  
• An action is determined by an initial situation constituted by the individual. If he or she 
experiences a difference between is and ought in respect to moral issues, he or she perceives 
a morally relevant ‘problem’1. Experiencing such a problem motivates further judgments and 
 
1 The definition of problem used here mainly points to the individually constituted discrepancy between is and 
ought. In terms of problem-solving approaches (e.g. following Dörner, 1979), it includes tasks and problems 
(for a more sophisticated discussion, see Heinrichs, 2005).  
2. Association of ways of acting (scripts) (maybe
alternatives for obeying or transgressing a moral
rule)
Personal conditions
(mental models of the situation as mental 
representations including, for instance, 
motives, values, and former experiences) 
Situational conditions
(elements of the objective reality) 
1. Subjectively constituted situation
3. Valence of the anticipated ways of acting
4. Comittment towards one way of acting (in line
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actions, and marks the important starting point of the action process. Insofar as actions are 
determined by a situation subjectively constituted at the beginning of the process, the 
constituted situation is determined by personal and situational conditions. 
• The action process is reconstructed and theoretically divided into four phases: (1) forming 
an intention, (2) planning, (3) implementation/conduct, and (4) evaluation.  
• The central output of the first phase is an intention. The agent is willing and feels committed 
to realising and achieving an aim. This means he or she has made a decision towards aims 
or actions. Sometimes, the individual already has the aim linked to a concrete action plan; 
otherwise, the concrete action will have to be specified during the implementation phase. 
• This intention might be formed if the agent has perceived a problem, if he or she feels 
confident he or she can find a solution (at least in the future), if he or she is motivated to 
contribute to solving the problem, and, moreover, if a status of self-commitment was 
developed and expresses the volitional power to overcome barriers during the 
implementation phase (see Figure 1). This means that the intention, as a measurable product 
of inner processes, has to be connected to the status of commitment and to be of notable 
valence.  
Regarding patterns of moral decision-making (HV, UV, UM, HM), forming an intention is the 
first of four phases in the action process. If a person has experienced a morally relevant problem (defined 
as a subjectively perceived gap between is and ought), then this individual might perceive a tension 
between obeying a moral rule and fulfilling his or her personal needs, and between different aims or 
actions. He or she might experience an ambivalence between cognitive, emotional, or motivational 
states, particularly if he or she attributes negative emotions towards his or her preferred way of behaving 
(UV or UM). If the person perceives an inner conflict, he or she might not yet feel committed to one 
aim or action. To form an intention and progress into action, he or she must then decide among 
alternatives. Referring to action theory, cognitive control strategies, in the sense of volitional strategies, 
play a major role in increasing commitment (Heckhausen, 1987; Heinrichs, 2005; 2013; Sokolowski, 
1993; 1996). Volitional strategies support dealing with inner conflict or ambivalence in such a way that, 
finally, a state of commitment to one out of several possible actions could be achieved. In relation to 
patterns of moral decision-making, this means that the person feels committed to obeying or 
transgressing against a moral rule. It is assumed that such a state of self-commitment can only be reached 
if the individual anticipates being able to cope with upcoming negative consequences or conflicts.  
As research shows that patterns such as HV emerge depending on the quality of a moral conflict, 
it can be assumed that there is a need to apply cognitive control strategies across situations that might 
vary according to the extent of moral intensity. A situation’s moral intensity depends on how an 
individual perceives elements of reality (see Figure 1; for more details on the concept of moral intensity, 
see Jones, 1991). Facing some ‘situational’ prompts, individuals may experience (intense) internal 
conflicts and high moral intensity. This could be expected, for example, in moral dilemmas that studies 
in moral psychology—especially in the Kohlbergian tradition—focused on, and that are supposed to 
seldomly emerge in everyday life. Contrastingly, situations of low moral intensity are assumed to be 
more frequent. Individuals perceive low moral intensity if they do not recognise an internal conflict, or 
if they quite easily make a decision towards one preferred action. Many people may perceive low moral 
intensity, for example, when transgressing against a moral rule only has (mild) negative consequences 
such as increased economic costs or treating others slightly unfairly, rather than causing physical or 
psychological harm.  
In line with the process model of acting, we may assume that if people experience an inner 
conflict, forming an intention might be a matter of reflective (vs. intuitive) data processing. In moral 
conflicts and situations of high moral intensity, an individual might perceive a need for self-commitment 
and apply cognitive control strategies. Conversely, in situations of low to moderate moral intensity, an 
individual might experience a smaller difference between is and ought. People may display tendencies 
towards one action or another more easily and intuitively, based on automatic (cognitive and affective) 
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processes of moral motivation (Haidt & Craig, 2008; Heinrichs, 2005; 2013; Rothmund & Baumert, 
2014). However, even in cases of less conscious modes of data processing in which an individual has a 
clear preference for an action, for example in situations of low moral intensity or situations the individual 
has faced before, cognitive control strategies are assumed to play an important role in building 
commitment.  
Taking situations of low intensity into account in research on moral actions may be important 
from an educational perspective. One possible scenario is that people who choose victimising in 
situations of low moral intensity may become used to it or even continue to transgress morally, even in 
situations of moderate or high moral intensity. Contrastingly, people who accept victimising in 
situations of low moral intensity might switch to obeying moral rules in situations of higher moral 
intensity. However, studying the development of HV and its determinants is an important question for 
further research and not the aim of this paper. Therefore, these considerations encouraged us to study 
patterns of moral decision-making in situations of low moral intensity as a first step and a matter of 
moral sensibility (Thoma & Bebeau, 2013; Tirri, 1999). 
Thus, the process model of acting theoretically allows one to specify the role of cognitive control 
strategies as part of forming an intention. It is also assumed that intentions may differ in valence, that 
is, in strength of commitment or in their volitional power. Further, the volitional power of one’s 
intentions impacts how barriers need to be overcome during the implementation phase (Heckhausen et 
al., 1987; Heinrichs, 2005).  
However, the process model of acting is first limited to theoretically reconstructing a sequence 
of input and output of inner sub-processes. Admittedly, an individual cannot be conscious of these 
psychological processes; instead, it is assumed that the individual is at least potentially aware of the 
content or results of subprocesses, such as intentions, emotion attributions, or cognitive control 
strategies, applied in a particular situation (Nisbett-Wilson-Thesis; see Neuweg, 1999). Thus, 
identifying relevant content or output of subprocesses, as mentioned above, could serve to 
systematically develop hypotheses concerning the links between them as results of subprocesses of 
actions in certain situations, such as the thesis that people who decide to victimise others and feel happy 
may have applied control strategies and deactivated self-sanctions, particularly regarding a specific 
situation. 
Moreover, the process model of acting does not provide concepts specifying different kinds or 
qualities of cognitive control strategies; however, self-regulation theory does. The concept of MDS 
(Bandura, 1990; 2002; 2016) focuses on mechanisms people apply when choosing non-moral actions, 
such as transgressing against moral rules or victimising others. Thus, in this paper, MDS are chosen to 
specify mechanisms that supposedly support people in decision-making when experiencing internal 
conflict or ambivalence. Applying MDS may support the formation of intentions, even to engage in 
‘immoral’ behaviours, such as moral transgressions or victimising others. 
2.3 Moral Disengagement Strategies 
During the last two decades, MDS have been studied in various contexts (Bandura, 2016), 
including those related to situations of high moral intensity (e.g., McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006) 
and lower moral intensity, such as in work-related contexts (Moore et al., 2012), sports (Boardley & 
Kavussanu, 2007), or connected to leadership issues (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008). Empirical 
findings reveal that MDS affect prosocial behaviours and transgressions in childhood, adolescence 
(Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001), and adulthood (Detert et al., 2008; Fida, 
Paciello, Tramontano, Fontaine, Barbaranelli, & Farnese, 2015; Moore et al., 2012; Osofsky, Bandura, 
& Zimbardo, 2005). Research reveals that MDS as a personal trait impacts ethical and unethical 
behaviour in a wide range of morally relevant situations—not only in situations of high moral intensity, 
such as moral dilemmas, but also in situations of lower moral intensity (Moore et al., 2012). Bandura 
assumed that “self-sanctions keep conduct in line with internal standards” (Bandura, 1990, p. 28). 
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Otherwise, “disengagement of moral self-sanctions enables people to compromise their moral standards 
and still retain their senses of moral integrity” (Bandura, 2016, p. 2). He differentiated four loci of MDS: 
locus of the behaviour, agent of action, outcomes of action, and recipients affected by action. Each of 
these loci indicates strategies allowing an individual to ignore moral standards and follow non-moral 
values (Bandura, 2016; Osofsky et al., 2005). The findings clearly indicate that MDS have the power to 
specifically explain unethical behaviour. 
However, MDS are mostly measured by using a scale to understand the propensity as a trait or 
tendency to apply MDS in adolescence (Bandura et al., 2001), and an adapted version for adults (Moore 
et al., 2012). Findings have confirmed individuals’ propensity to use MDS as a predictor of unethical 
behaviour. Furthermore, Bandura reported that MDS was triggered by specific contextual factors 
(Bandura, 2002; Moore et al., 2012). Nevertheless, there is still a lack of insight into what type of MDS 
are applied in certain situations and whether MDS preference varies across situations.  
According to the process model of acting as explained above, MDS might be particularly 
important in cases of ambivalence or conflicting aims or intentions. Additionally, MDS may affect 
forming an intention not only during reflective data processing but is assumed also to function as a filter 
in information processing when an individual intuitively commits to a non-moral action. An individual 
might make a decision based on heuristics, habits, or routines in everyday life, especially in cases of 
lower ambivalence and lower moral intensity, or when he or she does not have the opportunity to reflect, 
or accepts a suboptimal solution (Esser, 1996; Heinrichs, 2005). 
Additionally, it can be assumed, in line with the MDS approach, that people with a high personal 
tendency towards MDS might develop a set of justifications consistent with their moral self, to manage 
internal ambivalence and conflicts in these morally relevant situations. MDS may function as cognitive 
control (or volitional) strategies and support forming an intention towards victimising or obeying moral 
rules. Thus, the application of MDS used in a particular situation may (sometimes) become visible if 
people are asked for the reasons behind their preferred actions.  
2.4 Research Questions 
To summarise, this paper offers theoretical approaches intended to contribute to explaining 
patterns of moral decision-making, such as the HV pattern, along with the process model of acting 
(Heinrichs, 2005) and the concept of MDS (Bandura, 2016). The theoretical considerations focus on a 
procedural perspective of acting, particularly on reconstructing how happy or unhappy people are who 
intend to break or obey moral rules and, thus, show patterns of intentions with varying valence. It is 
assumed that patterns of moral decision-making and emotion attributions represent results of processes 
determined by personal and situational conditions, and may vary interpersonally and situationally.  
In addition to this theoretical approach to reconstructing the HV pattern, this paper is intended 
to empirically explore whether situational stimuli of low moral intensity may provoke intrapersonal 
variation of HV or UV patterns across situations. Moreover, it is intended to gain insights and explore 
whether and to what extent adults apply MDS in given situations. The following research questions are 
addressed: 
(1) To what extent do adults apply victimising strategies in situations of low moral intensity? 
(2) Do patterns of moral decision-making and emotion attributions among adults vary intra-
personally across situations of low intensity? 
(3) To what extent do adults apply MDS to justify victimisation in (different) situations of low 
moral intensity? 
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3. Method 
3.1 Data Collection and Sample Characteristics 
In total, 587 university students from Goethe University, Frankfurt (Germany; n = 201) and the 
University of Bamberg (Germany; n = 344) were surveyed using self-report questionnaires. Thirty-four 
students were guest students from other universities and eight students did not report their university 
affiliation. On average, students had studied in total for 3.3 semesters (SD = 1.8, Min. = 1, Max. = 12). 
Our sample comprised 213 male and 364 female students (10 students did not provide information 
regarding gender), with a mean age of 22.3 (SD = 2.9) years. Thus, participants were emerging adults. 
Of the observed students, 28.3% were studying to become teachers, 47.4% were studying economics, 
and 11.6 % were studying business education and educational management. Participant filled in a self-
report, paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Questionnaires were provided in different university courses 
(e.g., educational psychology in the subject of teacher education studies, basics of scientific work, 
business ethics); thus, we used convenience sampling. 
In the questionnaire, students were confronted with descriptions of morally relevant situations. 
The stimuli used in this study did not focus on extreme moral conflicts or dilemmas, such as the death 
penalty, but focused on situations of lower moral intensity that emerge in everyday life. Negative 
consequences of victimising others were limited to economic effects, such as high costs or losing money, 
or neglecting values relevant to social interactions, like honesty, trust, or legality. In the given cases, 
bodily harm or even death were not focused on as relevant consequences if the rule was disobeyed. 
Moreover, we were interested in whether adults deal with such situations of lower moral intensity using 
sophisticated heuristics, in line with MDS. 
In response to open-ended questions, the students were asked to make decisions, anticipate their 
own emotions, and provide reasons for their decisions and emotions; more precisely, we asked for their 
intentions. This way of capturing the HV pattern has been described from a self-perpetrator perspective 
as “self-judgments” (Keller et al., 2003; Yuill, Pearson, Pearbhoy, & van den Ende, 1996; see also 
Heinrichs et al., this issue). Patterns of moral decision-making (here representing patterns of intentions) 
were coded (HV, UV, UM, HM). To explore whether cognitive control strategies, for example MDS, 
play a role in the action process, a content analysis of participants’ answers to open-ended questions 
regarding morally relevant decisions was conducted. The results are based on qualitative data (not the 
scale of MDS). Consistent with the concept of moral disengagement, data analysis was limited to 
participants who decided to transgress. Applying MDS is assumed to indicate perceived ambivalence, 
an output of moral decision-making in respect to selected situations. Moreover, this operationalisation 
of ‘applied MDS’ indicates that MDS play a role in the action process and intention formation, either 
before committing to a particular action, or afterwards to justify a previously made decision.  
3.2 Operationalisation of Constructs 
3.2.1 Patterns of Moral Decision-making 
To identify the situation-specific patterns of moral decision-making in terms of HM, UM, HV, 
and UV, we used descriptions of two hypothetical situations of low moral intensity. In this study, moral 
intensity varied only regarding one criterion reported by Jones (1991): the quality of the relationship 
between perpetrator and victim. Other criteria that could potentially cause situations to be perceived as 
differing in moral intensity remained consistent across situations included in the survey. In Situation 1 
(‘Travel costs’: an employee has to decide how to act confronted with the temptation to claim travel 
costs without having expenses), we chose a legal person (an organisation) as the victim, and in Situation 
2 (‘Change’: a person receives to much change and has to decide to give the money back or not), we 
chose a natural person as the victim (for further description of the two situations, see the Appendix). 
HM, UM, HV, and UV were coded based on participants’ decisions as a relevant part of intentions. 
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Participants answered the question ‘what would you do’ (give the money back as the moral strategy vs. 
keep the money as the victimising strategy; self-judgment perspective). Additionally, they rated their 
corresponding emotional state (‘How would you feel?’) by choosing one of the following options: very 
good, rather good, rather bad, or very bad. The ratings were re-coded as ‘happy’ (very good and rather 
good) and ‘unhappy’ (very bad and rather bad). Therefore, the HM pattern was operationalised by 
keeping a moral rule and feeling (very or rather) happy, and the UM pattern was defined by keeping a 
moral rule and feeling (very or rather) bad. Furthermore, the HV pattern was defined by violating a 
moral rule and feeling (very or rather) happy, and the UV pattern was defined by violating a moral rule 
and feeling (very or rather) bad. 
3.2.2 Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement 
In the context of moral decision-making, participants were asked to provide reasons for their 
decisions. On that basis, answers to open-ended questions were coded to organise the given reasons via 
a coding scheme for mechanisms of MDS, as adopted from the work of Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, 
and Pastorelli (1996). In line with the idea of MDS, only the answers of participants who decided to 
violate the moral rule (HV or UV) were considered. In total, the coding scheme consisted of the eight 
mechanisms of MDS and a category ‘others’, as described in Table 1. 
The reported coding scheme was the basis for coding participants’ reasons for their decisions. 
The coding categories were a priori defined theoretically and coding rules were determined, thus 
constituting the theoretical basis of our analysis (Creswell, 2014; Schreier, 2012). Two independent 
researchers performed the coding. Both were well-trained with sample codes. Within a training round, 
the coders coded the participants' responses. When codes did not match, the respective sense units were 
discussed and assigned to a category by reaching a consensus. The category system was then further 
differentiated and validated. Thus, the coding procedure was guided by the standard procedure of 
qualitative content analysis as described Mayring (2015). To assess the inter-rater reliability of the 
coding, 64 reasons given by the participants (33 cases of Situation 1 and 31 cases of Situation 2), 
corresponding to almost 23 % of the overall applicable 280 cases, were coded by the two independent 
coders. Cohen's kappa score was 0.613 for the cases using Situation 1, and 0.713 for those using 
Situation 2. For all the 64 double-coded cases, Cohen’s kappa reached 0.7. Therefore, the situation-
specific coding, as well the overall coding, showed satisfactory inter-rater reliability that could be 
classified as “substantial” (range from 0.61 to 0.8), according to the corresponding ranges of kappa with 
respect to Landis and Koch (1977). Cases coded in category ‘9 Others’ were discussed individually by 
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Table 1 
Coding Scheme for Mechanisms of MDS 
Nr. Category Definition Coding example 
1 Moral justification Person justifies his/her behaviour with the usefulness of 
other moral purposes respectively values. The behaviour is 
justified as it has been put into the service of other moral 
values. A reputable, respectable, or even honourable sense 
is given to the behaviour. 
Reciprocity between driver and passenger has been 
considered, and the passenger payed part of the costs.   
I hand over the 50 euros to 
the friend who has been 
driving. 
2 Euphemistic language Person whitewashes his/her behaviour. The behaviour is 
trivialised. In comparison, the category ‘distorting 
consequences; minimizing, ignoring, or misconstruing the 
consequences’, a reference to self-interest, is NOT made. 
The sculpture is not worth 50 
euros. 
3 Advantageous / 
palliative comparison 
Person compares his/her behaviour to potentially worse 
behaviour in order to present his/her own behaviour as less 
drastic and himself/herself more advantageously. 
I could also have robbed the 
seller. 
4 Displacement of 
responsibility 
Person justifies his/her behaviour as result of (social) 
pressure, which has forced him/her to display this 
behaviour, without having the option to act in a different 
way. He/she does not face his/her behaviour, lying in 
his/her own area of responsibility, but in aspects which are 
not within this area of responsibility.  
IMPORTANT: This category does NOT refer to the 
circumstance of the victim being blamed for this injurious 
behaviour himself/herself. In this case the category 
‘attribution of blame’ has to be encoded. 
It is within my supervisor’s 
responsibility to check the 
travelling expenses 
appropriately. 
5 Diffusion of 
responsibility 
Person transfers the responsibility for his/her own actions 
to other people of a group. 
My colleagues do that, too. 
6 Distorting 
consequences; 
Minimizing, ignoring, or 
misconstruing the 
consequences 
The self-interest of an action supersedes negative 
consequences of this action for other people. Negative 
consequences of the action are hidden and/or subjectively 
minimised. In comparison to the category ‘euphemistic 
language’ in this case a positive self-interest of the action 
is constructed specifically. 
I am a poor student and don't 
have money myself. 
7 Attribution of blame ‘Blaming the victim’ – The responsibility for the own 
injurious behaviour is transferred to the victim 
himself/herself. What has happened to the victim is his/her 
own fault. 
The blame falls on the 
person who performed 
incorrect calculations 
8 Dehumanisation All (human) qualities are denied from the victim and 
injuring him/her is therefore considered as legally and 
respectively not morally reprehensible. Analogous to the 
degrading of a human victim, a non-human victim (in the 
sense of a legal entity) can also be devalued, which 
justifies an injury. 
The capitalistic companies 
have already obtained 
enough money. 
9 Others All justifications which could not be classified within 
categories 1-8 were encoded in ‘others’. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Variation of Patterns of Moral Decision-making Across Situations 
First, analyses were conducted to answer research questions 1 and 2. The results (see Table 2) 
indicated that all patterns of moral decision-making can be found in the sample. Most participants chose 
HM (Situation 1: 66.4 %; Situation 2: 73.6 %). However, 10.7 % in Situation 2 (n = 61) and up to 19.4 
% (n = 110) in Situation 1 showed the HV pattern. Thus, victimising patterns can be applied in this 
sample of adults. 
 
Table 2 
Intra-personal Connections and Variations of Patterns of Moral Decision-making 
      Sit. 2 Change   














frequency 20 18 69 3 110 
% within 
situation 1 18.2% 16.4% 62.7% 2.7% 100.0% 
% within 
situation 2 32.8% 25.4% 16.5% 16.7% 19.4% 
unhappy 
victimizer 
frequency 3 7 43 2 55 
% within 
situation 1 5.5% 12.7% 78.2% 3.6% 100.0% 
% within 
situation 2 4.9% 9.9% 10.3% 11.1% 9.7% 
happy 
moralizer 
frequency 35 46 294 2 377 
% within 
situation 1 9.3% 12.2% 78.0% .5% 100.0% 
% within 
situation 2 57.4% 64.8% 70.3% 11.1% 66.4% 
unhappy 
moralizer 
frequency 3 0 12 11 26 
% within 
situation 1 11.5% 0.0% 46.2% 42.3% 100.0% 
% within 
situation 2 4.9% 0.0% 2.9% 61.1% 4.6% 
  total frequency 61 71 418 18 568 
    % within 
situation 1 10.7% 12.5% 73.6% 3.2% 100.0% 
    % within 
situation 2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note. Pearson χ2 = 152.092, df = 9, p < 0.001;  
19 participants had a missing value for at least one of the two situations. 
Regarding research question 2, Cramer’s V (0.299; p < 0.001; Pearson χ2 = 152.092, df = 9, p 
< 0.001) indicated a moderate-sized intrapersonal consistency of patterns of moral decision-making. 
However, there were participants who changed their pattern of moral decision-making across situations. 
For example, more than 25% out of students who rated HM in Situation 2 rated victimising in Situation 
1.  
4.2 Mechanisms of MDS as Reasons for Violating a Moral Rule 
Along with the theoretical assumption of MDS, only those participants who chose victimising 
strategies were integrated into the content analyses to answer research question 3. The findings indicated 
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that MDS were applied in the situations presented by those participants who chose victimising (Situation 
1: n = 159; Situation 2: n = 111). Descriptive frequency analyses showed that all categories of MDS 
were used across both situations, though some mechanisms were not used in situations 2. However, 
frequency of the different MDS varied across situational stimuli (see Figures 2 and 3). 
 
Figure 2. Mechanisms of MD as Reasons for Violating a Moral Rule: Situation 1—Travel Costs 
 
 
Categories of MDS: (1) Moral justification, (2) Euphemistic language, (3) Advantageous/palliative comparison, 
(4) Displacement of responsibility, (5) Diffusion of responsibility, (6) Minimizing, ignoring, or 
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Figure 3. Mechanisms of MDS as Reasons for Violating a Moral Rule: Situation 2—Change 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
5.1 Main Findings and Limitations 
The process model of acting offers a framework to elucidate the role of cognitive control 
strategies, particularly MDS, to forming intentions towards following or breaking a moral rule in 
situations of low moral intensity. Further, it can provide theoretical progress and allows for a better 
understanding of patterns of moral decision-making and emotion attributions, such as HV, UV, UM, 
and HM (aims and valence), in morally relevant situations. Thus, this approach allows for the integration 
of perspectives of other theoretical approaches to HV in adulthood, as presented by Minnameier (this 
issue) and Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger and Latzko (this issue). The action-based perspective presented in 
this paper consider cognitive and emotional as well as volitional processes.  
Additionally, the present study offers empirical results underlying the theoretical assumptions 
of the action-based approach to the HV pattern in situations of low moral intensity. The results related 
to research questions 1 and 2 merely support the findings of former studies regarding adults’ patterns of 
moral decision-making, as adults decided to victimise, and victimising emerged as a result of person-
situation interactions. The patterns showed significant intrapersonal consistency; however, at the same 
time some participants showed variations in patterns across situations (Heinrichs et al., 2015). 
Moreover, the results of the present study enrich former empirical research on patterns of moral 
decision-making in adulthood, particularly by focusing on patterns of intentions in situations of low 
moral intensity. Additionally, MDS were assessed in the context of moral transgressions, not as a 
personal tendency. Qualitative content analysis provided codes of MDS within answers to open-ended 
questions, and showed that students who chose victimising applied MDS in the two given situations of 
low moral intensity, to a relevant extent. Frequency analyses of the different categories of MDS 
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(4) Displacement of responsibility, (5) Diffusion of responsibility, (6) Minimizing, ignoring, or 
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indicated that MDS use differed in quality and quantity across situations and between participants who 
attribute positive or negative emotions (between participants who show patterns of UV and HV; Figures 
2 and 3). In future research, it could be interesting to collect data from a bigger sample to go beyond 
descriptive methods of analyses and test whether these differences in MDS use can be confirmed as 
significant effects triggered by situational conditions or as a personal tendency of MDS use.  
However, the present study does not provide valid empirical evidence, but rather empirical 
insights regarding patterns of moral decision-making (UM, UV, HV, HM) and MDS use. Thus, our 
empirical approach obviously has various limitations that are discussed comprehensively, to point out 
the potential of the presented approach to gain theoretical and empirical progress in future research 
(Lakatos, 1978).  
 
5.1.1 Limitations and Further Perspectives Regarding Methods and Data Collection 
The present data were collected to examine to what extent moral decision-making, emotion 
attribution, and MDS use emerged as intra-personally consistent or varying across situations. Assuming 
that patterns of moral decision-making, as well as MDS use, are the results of person-situation 
interactions, only two situational stimuli were used for comparisons between different situational 
conditions. However, no personal determinants or traits were included to control for personal conditions. 
Thus, the results only allow for developing a hypothesis that patterns of moral decision-making might 
show up with intra-personal consistency, to a particular extent, while also indicating there is intra-
personal variation across situations that has not yet been explained. Regarding MDS use, the results 
were mostly limited to a descriptive level. MDS use was coded based on the participants’ answers to 
open-ended questions, in line with the theoretical assumption that they would only be used if a person 
had also chosen ‘victimising’. That led to a reduced sample of the coded MDS: 159 participants for 
Situation 1, 111 participants for Situation 2, and only 32 participants who expressed MDS in both 
situations. Thus, this study does not provide reliable data on intrapersonal stability or variation of MDS 
use. Intra-personal consistent use vs. variation of MDS use across situations of low moral intensity 
should be studied in future investigations.  
Additionally, the present study is limited to situations of low moral intensity, predominantly 
characterised as situations of temptation. Thus, the results do not provide information on how people 
react in situations of high moral intensity. Furthermore, decisions were measured using the self-
judgment perspective (‘what would you do?’ and ‘How would you feel?’; Heinrichs et al., this issue) as 
indicators of participants’ intentions (aims, valence). However, in future research, it could be fruitful to 
use other methods to detect whether and to what extent participants experience ambivalence or internal 
conflict, and to what extent they feel committed to one method of action.  
Moreover, participants were asked how they would act and feel in hypothetical situations 
presented as text-based stimuli. Thus, the decisions they made in this study do not necessarily 
correspond to the behaviour they would display in real life. Furthermore, there is a need to develop more 
realistic settings of data collection, allowing for a better understanding of decision-making, emotions, 
and actions. This might be possible, for example, in the field or with experimental studies. The results 
of the present investigation might also differ from those studies, if the participants were encouraged to 
reflect on their intentions as related to stimuli presented in an interview and embedded in interpersonal 
conversation, or to come up with their own narratives telling their experiences or motives in obeying or 
breaking moral rules in their everyday lives. Moreover, from the very beginning of HV research, the 
measurement procedure has been criticised for not really identifying emotions, but emotion attributions 
or emotion justifications. It would be important to develop sophisticated and valid measures of moral 
emotions in the context of patterns of moral decision-making (see Heinrichs et al., 2015; Gutzwiller-
Helfenfinger & Latzko, this issue).  
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5.1.2 Limitations and Further Perspectives in Regard to Displaying the Process of Acting 
Therefore, to reflect on the present study, the results call for further research to provide deeper 
insights into the process of intention formation and further sub-processes of moral actions. It would be 
interesting to know whether and to what extent individuals differ in subjectively constituted problems 
or in assessing the moral intensity of situations, depending on their individual moral principles or values, 
on self- and social sanctions, and on non-moral values and needs. MDS use and HV or UV patterns may 
emerge, at least in different forms, depending on whether ambivalence or internal conflict was 
perceived, or whether the individual managed to cope with his or her negative emotions (Bandura, 
2016). To build commitment to one preferred way of acting (victimising or moral acting), the agent has 
to activate mechanisms of self-regulation based on social or self-sanctions (Bandura, 2016). 
Nevertheless, we must admit that the way of measuring intentions, emotions, or applied MDS regarding 
the given situations is far from validly displaying the sequence of inner sub-processes. In future research, 
specific experimental studies may offer, for example, data on forming an intention, attributing emotions, 
or justifying decisions under contrasting conditions. 
5.1.3 Limitations and Further Perspectives From a Developmental Perspective 
Furthermore, this paper mainly focused on the process of acting rather than on individual 
development. The present study only captures one measurement point and includes students 
representing emerging adults. To develop implications for moral education, it would be relevant to at 
least study the development of relevant personal determinants, such as MDS. Research on MDS has 
provided interesting results from a developmental perspective. Osofsky, Bandura, and Zimbardo (2005) 
indicated a low, but significant correlation between MDS and age. Older participants reported higher 
levels of MDS. However, a correlation between age and MDS only provides superficial indications and 
calls for a deeper understanding of underlying processes. In respect to this, Bandura offered a more 
sophisticated assumption, that the development of MDS is in line with a change of preference from 
social sanctions in childhood and earlier years to self-sanctions among adults (Bandura, 2016). This idea 
is quite consistent with the basic assumption in the Kohlbergian tradition of studying moral 
development. Kohlberg claims social sanctions to be important at the preconventional level. At the 
conventional level, not one person but a social group or system, may sanction deviant or immoral 
behaviour. At the postconventional level the agent is assumed to have developed into a person with 
autonomous judgement and a strong ‘moral self’, committed to a hierarchy of values, and able to reflect 
on moral problems from a perspective of legitimacy. Thus, the relevance of social sanctions seems to 
decrease; however, self-sanctions might increase on the way to higher moral stages. However, there is 
empirical evidence that such an individual-constructivist (vs. social-constructivist) idea of moral 
development towards an autonomous moral self ignores phenomena such as situational impact on moral 
judgements and patterns of HV (as well as HM, UM, HM) during adolescence and adulthood (Beck & 
Parche-Kawik, 2004; Heinrichs et al., 2015; Krebs & Denton, 2005).  
5.2 Conclusions 
The action-theoretical approach presented in this paper provides a perspective to explain HV as 
a pattern emerging within the action process, particularly regarding immoral behaviour among adults. 
People choose to jeopardise their own standards and seem to feel happy about a decision in favour of a 
moral transgression if they manage to find ways to cope with inner conflicts and get strongly committed 
towards their intention. This idea is in line with Bandura, who presented the concept of moral 
disengagement as an indicator of lacking self-regulation concerning cases of immoral behaviour. To 
conclude, the three approaches, the action-theoretical model, the HV pattern in adulthood as a pattern 
emerging during the process of acting, as well as the concept of moral disengagement, address the same 
basic question: how can people act in ways that contradict their moral principles, at least in some 
situations, without feeling distress or having a bad conscience? This study indicates that we have to 
acknowledge that breaking moral rules or standards is quite common, even among adults, at least as 
studied here in situations of lower moral intensity. Otherwise, findings have revealed that people do 
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commit to fairness, sharing, and others’ well-being (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, 
2006).  
However, the results presented are far from being valid for drawing evidence-based conclusions 
concerning moral education.  Nevertheless, the approach reconstructs (happy or unhappy) victimising 
in an action-based perspective as a result of intention formation, and provides long-term perspectives 
for education that also differ from those discussed in this special issue on the HV pattern in adulthood 
and adolescence (Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger & Latzko, this issue; Minnameier, this issue). To reduce 
MDS use or foster reflective use of strategies like MDS offers an approach that differs from common 
methods of moral education, such as supporting moral judgment competence with respect to cognitive 
development (Minnameier, 2012), fostering moral expertise (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005), or developing 
moral emotions (Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger & Latzko, this issue).  
Additionally, from an educational perspective, the results of the present study only pointed to 
the empirical ‘is’ in decision-making, intentions, emotion attributions, and moral disengagement in 
morally relevant situations. There is an additional need to discuss aims considering also norms and 
values and legitimate curricula. It seems important to reflect on whether students should be encouraged 
to follow their moral ideals in certain situations, even if they must accept great (personal) disadvantages. 
Perhaps it would be preferable to enable them to balance their own needs and those of others. 
Minnameier would argue that sometimes, it is morally adequate to behave as a strategic moralist 
(Minnameier, this issue; Minnameier, Heinrichs & Kirschbaum, 2016). He states, for example, that to 
implement trustful cooperation in the long term, depending on the situational conditions, an individual 
may have to adopt his or her way of acting towards moral standards of partners or one’s environment. 
Sometimes it may be recommended to look for strategies (e.g., in cooperative games) that may lead to 
moral behaviours in a sense of an overarching moral aim, such as developing trustful cooperation and 
preventing others from pursuing only their own needs and getting rich at the expense of the individual 
in the long-term.  
Overall, there are considerably contrasting positions concerning the aims of moral education. It 
is discussed controversially whether moral education should focus on struggling to promote 
autonomously judging moral agents and accept that some of them may end up as unhappy moralists 
(Oser & Reichenbach, 2005), or whether it would be better to foster individuals who are able to choose 
ways of acting that may lead to showing HV patterns when considering the situational conditions for 
implementing morality and acting as strategic moralists. However, there seems to be a common position 
underlying this discourse of ‘successfully engaging in meaningful, positive and caring relationships is 
both a prerequisite for and consequence of successful teaching and learning processes (Malti, Häcker, 
& Nakamura, 2009). Moreover, meaningful relationships are especially important in a globalised society 
[…]‘ (Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger & Heinrichs, this issue) to create a ‘moral atmosphere’ (Kohlberg, 1984), 
supporting moral actions and the development of socio-moral competencies. 
Key points 
 Adults tending towards moral transgression used various moral disengagement strategies 
(MDS) across situations. 
 Fostering a reflective use of MDS might support formation of intentions with high valence 
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Abbreviations 
HM = happy moralizing pattern; HV = happy victimizing pattern; MDS = moral 
disengagement strategies; UM = unhappy moralizing pattern; UV = unhappy victimizing 
pattern 
References 
Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in terrorism. In Reich, W. (Ed.), Origins of 
terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind (pp. 161–191). Cambridge: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Moral 
Education, 31(2), 101–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724022014322 
Bandura, A. (2016). Moral Disengagement: How people do harm and live with themselves. New York, 
NY: Worth Publishers. 
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral 
disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
71(2), 364–374. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.364 
Bandura, A., Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., Pastorelli, C., & Regalia, C. (2001). Sociocognitive self-
regulatory mechanisms governing transgressive behaviour. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 80(1), 125–135. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.80.1.125 
Beck, K., & Parche-Kawik, K. (2004). Das Mäntelchen im Wind? Zur Domänenspezifität moralischen 
Urteilens [The wave in the wind? Towards domain specificity of moral judging]. Zeitschrift für 
Pädagogik, 50(2), 244–265. 
Boardley, I. D., & Kavussanu, M. (2007). Development and validation of the moral disengagement in 
sport scale. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 29(5), 608–628. 
https://doi.org/10.1123/jsep.29.5.608 
Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (4th 
ed.). Los Angeles: Sage. 
Detert, J. R., Treviño, L. K., & Sweitzer, V. L. (2008). Moral disengagement in ethical decision-making: 
a study of antecedents and outcomes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(2), 374–391. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.93.2.374 
Döring, B. (2013). The development of moral identity and moral motivation in childhood and 
adolescence. In K. Heinrichs, F., Oser, & T. Lovat (Eds.), Handbook of moral motivation. Theories, 
models, applications (pp. 289–305). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Dörner, D. (1979). Problemlösen als Informationsverarbeitungsprozess [Problem solving as information 
processing]. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., & Spinrad, T. L. (2007). Prosocial development. In N. Eisenberg, W. 
Damon, & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Social, emotional, and personality 
development (p. 646–718). John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470147658.chpsy0311 
Esser, H. (1996). Die Definition der Situation [Definition of the Situation]. Kölner Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 48(1), 1–34. 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151 
Heinrichs, Kärner & Reinke	
 
42 | F L R  
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (2006). The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism: Experimental 
evidence and new theories. In: S.-C. Kolm, & J. M. Ythier (Eds.), Handbook of the economics of 
giving, altruism and reciprocity (pp. 615–691). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. Evolution and Human 
Behaviour, 25(2), 63–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4 
Fida, R., Paciello, M., Tramontano, C., Fontaine, R. G., Barbaranelli, C., & Farnese, M. L. (2015). An 
integrative approach to understanding counterproductive work behaviour: The roles of stressors, 
negative emotions, and moral disengagement. Journal of Business Ethics, 130(1), 131–144. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2209-5 
Gasser, L., Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, E., Latzko, B., & Malti, T. (2013). Moral emotion attributions and 
moral motivation. In K. Heinrichs, F. Oser, & T. Lovat (Eds.), Handbook of moral motivation. 
theories, models and applications (pp. 304–320). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Gollwitzer, P.M. (1996). Rubikonmodell der Handlungsphasen. [Rubikon model of action phases] In J. 
Kuhl, & H. Heckhausen (Eds.), Motivation, Volition und Handlung (pp. 531–582). Göttingen: 
Hogrefe.  
Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, E., & Heinrichs, K. (2020). The happy victimizer pattern in adulthood – state 
of the art and contrasting approaches: Introduction to the special issue. Frontline Learning 
Research, 8(5), 1-4. https://doi.org/10.14786/flr.v8i5.681 
Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, E., & Latzko, B. (2020). Happy victimizing in emerging adulthood: 
reconstruction of a developmental phenomenon? Frontline Learning Research, 8(5), 47-69. 
https://doi.org/10.14786/flr.v8i5.382 
Haidt, J., & Craig J. (2008). The moral mind: How five sets of innate intuitions guide the development 
of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S.P. 
Stich (Eds.), The innate mind: Foundations and the future, evolution and cognition (Vol. 3; pp. 
367–391). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heckhausen, H., Gollwitzer, P.M., & Weinert, F. E. (1987). Jenseits des Rubikon [Beyond the Rubicon]. 
Berlin: Springer. 
Heinrichs, K. (2005). Urteilen und Handeln – Ein Prozessmodell und seine moralpsychologische 
Spezifizierung. [A process model of judging and acting and its moral psychological specification] 
(Vol. 12). Frankfurt a. M.: Peter-Lang-Verlag. 
Heinrichs, K. (2010). Urteilen und Handeln in der moralischen Entwicklung [Judging and action in a 
developmental perspective]. In B. Latzko, & T. Malti (Eds.), Moralentwicklung und 
Moralerziehung in Kindheit und Adoleszenz (S. 69–86). Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Heinrichs, K. (2013). Moral motivation in the light of action theory. In K. Heinrichs, F. Oser, & T. Lovat 
(Eds.), Handbook of Moral Motivation. Theories, Models and Applications (pp. 623–657). 
Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Heinrichs, K., Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, E., Latzko, B., Minnameier, G., & Döring, B. (2020). Happy 
Victimizing in adolescence and adulthood – Empirical findings and further perspectives, Frontline 
Learning Research, 8(5), 5-23. https://doi.org/10.14786/flr.v8i5.385 
Heinrichs, K., Minnameier, G., Latzko, B., & Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, E. (2015). „Don’t worry, be 
happy“? – Das Happy-Victimizer-Phänomen im berufs- und wirtschaftspädagogischen Kontext 
[“Don’t worry, be happy”? – The happy victimizer phenomenon in the context of vocational and 
business education]. Zeitschrift für Berufs- und Wirtschaftspädagogik, 111(1), 32–55. 
Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical decision-making by individuals in organisations: an issue contingent model. 
Academy of Management Review, 16(2), 366–395. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1991.4278958 
Heinrichs, Kärner & Reinke	
 
43 | F L R  
Keller, M., Lourenço, O., Malti, T., & Saalbach, H. (2003). The multifaceted phenomenon of ‘happy 
victimizers’: a cross‐cultural comparison of moral emotions. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 21(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1348/026151003321164582 
Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology on moral development: The nature and validity of moral stages 
(Vol. II). New York: Harper & Row. 
Krebs, D. L., & Denton, K. (2005). Toward a more pragmatic approach to morality: a critical evaluation 
of Kohlberg's model. Psychological Review, 112(3), 629–649. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.112.3.629 
Krettenauer, T., Malti, T., & Sokol, B. (2008). The development of moral emotions and the happy 
victimizer phenomenon: a critical review of theory and applications. European Journal of 
Developmental Science, 2, 221–235. https://doi.org/ 10.3233/DEV-2008-2303 
Lakatos, I. (1978). The Methodology of scientific research programmes. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. 
Biometrics, 33(1), 159–174. https://doi.org/ 10.2307/2529310 
Lapsley, D. K., & Narvaez, D. (2005). Moral psychology at the crossroads. Character psychology and 
character education, In D. K. Lapsley, & C. Power (Eds.), Character psychology and character 
education (pp. 18–35). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Latzko, B., & Malti, T. (2010). Children's moral emotions and moral cognition: Towards an integrative 
perspective. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 129, 1-10. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/cd.272 
Lind, G. (2019). Moral ist lehrbar!: Wie man moralisch-demokratische Fähigkeiten fördern und damit 
Gewalt, Betrug und Macht mindern kann [Morality can be taught! How we can foster moral-
democratic abilities and reduce violence, fraud and power]. Berlin: Logos. 
Malti, T., & Krettenauer, T. (2013). The relation of moral emotion attributions to prosocial and 
antisocial behaviour: A meta‐analysis. Child Development, 84, 397–412. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01851.x 
Malti, T., Häcker, T., & Nakamura, Y. (2009). Sozial-emotionales Lernen in der Schule [Socioemotional 
learning in schools]. Zurich: Pestalozzianum. 
Malti, T., Averdijk, M., Zuffianò, A., Ribeaud, D., Betts, L. R., Rotenberg, K. J., & Eisner, M. P. (2016). 
Children’s trust and the development of prosocial behavior. International Journal of Behavioral 
Development, 40(3), 262–270. https://doi.org/10.1177/0165025415584628 
Mayring, P. (2015). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken [Qualitative content 
analysis: Basics and techniques]. Weinheim: Beltz. 
McAlister, A. L., Bandura, A., & Owen, S. V. (2006). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in support 
of military force: The impact of Sept. 11. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 25(2), 141–
165. https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2006.25.2.141 
Minnameier, G. (2020). Explaining Happy Victimizing in adulthood – A cognitive and economic 
approach. Frontline Learning Research, 8(5),70 - 91. https://doi.org/10.14786/flr.v8i5.381 
Minnameier, G. (2012). A cognitive approach to the ‘happy victimizer’. Journal of Moral Education, 
41(4), 491–508. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2012.700893 
Minnameier, G., Heinrichs, K., & Kirschbaum, F. (2016). Sozialkompetenz als Moralkompetenz – 
Wirklichkeit und Anspruch? [Social competence as moral competence – reality and demand?]. 
Zeitschrift für Berufs- und Wirtschaftspädagogik, 112(4), 636–666. 
Heinrichs, Kärner & Reinke	
 
44 | F L R  
Minnameier, G., & Schmidt, S. (2013). Situational moral adjustment and the happy victimizer. European 
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 10(2), 253–268. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17405629.2013.765797 
Moore, C., Detert, J. R., Treviño, L., Baker, V. L., & Mayer, D. M. (2012). Why employees do bad 
things: Moral disengagement and unethical organisational behaviour. Personnel Psychology, 65(1), 
1–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2011.01237.x 
Narvaez, D., & Lapsley, D. K. (2005). The psychological foundations of everyday morality and moral 
expertise. In D. K. Lapsley, & C. Power (Eds.), Character psychology and character education 
(pp. 140–165). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Neuweg, G. H. (1999). Könnerschaft und implizites Wissen - Zur lehr-lerntheoretischen Bedeutung der 
Erkenntnis- und Wissenstheorie Michael Polanyis [Expertise and tacit knowledge – the relevance 
of Michael Polanyi’s theory of knowledge for teaching and learning]. Münster: Waxmann. 
Nunner-Winkler, G. (2013). Moral motivation and the happy victimizer phenomenon. In: K. Heinrichs, 
F. Oser, & T. Lovat (Eds.), Handbook of moral motivation. Theories, models, applications (pp. 
267–287). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Nunner-Winkler, G. (2007). Development of moral motivation from childhood to early adulthood. 
Journal of Moral Education, 36(4), 399–414. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240701687970 
Nunner-Winkler, G. (1993). Die Entwicklung moralischer Motivation [The development of moral 
motivation]. In W. Edelstein, G. Nunner-Winkler, & G. Noam, G. (Eds.), Moral und Person (pp. 
278–303). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Nunner-Winkler, G., & Sodian, B. (1988). Children's understanding of moral emotions. Child 
Development, 59, 1323–1338. https://doi.org/10.2307/1130495 
Oser, F. K., & Reichenbach, R. (2005). Moral resilience – The unhappy moralist. In W. Edelstein, & G. 
Nunner-Winkler (Eds.), Morality in context, advances in psychology (pp. 203–224). North Holland: 
Elsevier. 
Osofsky, M. J., Bandura, A., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2005). The role of moral disengagement in the 
execution process. Law and Human Behaviour, 29(4), 371–393. https://doi.org/10.2307/1130495  
Rothmund, T., & Baumert, A. (2014). Shame on me - implicit assessment of negative moral self-
evaluation in shame-proneness. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5(2), 195–202. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550613488950 
Schreier, M. (2012). Qualitative content analysis in practice. Los Angeles: Sage. 
Sokolowski, K. (1993). Emotion und Volition [Emotion and Volition]. Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Sokolowski K. (1996). Wille und Bewusstheit [Will and consciousness]. In: J. Kuhl, & H. Heckhausen 
(Eds.), Enzyklopädie der Psychologie: Themenbereich C Theorie und Forschung, Serie IV 
Motivation und Emotion, Band 4 Motivation, Volition und Handlung (pp. 485–530). Göttingen: 
Hogrefe. 
Thoma, S. J., & Bebeau, M. J. (2013). Moral motivation and the four component model. In K. Heinrichs, 
F. Oser, & T. Lovat (Eds.), Handbook of moral motivation. theories, models and applications (pp. 
49–67). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Tirri, K. (1999). Teachers' perceptions of moral dilemmas at school. Journal of Moral Education, 28(1), 
31–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/030572499103296 
Weinberger, A. & Frewein, K. (2019). VaKE (Values and Knowledge Education) als Methode zur 
Integration von Werterziehung im Fachunterricht in heterogenen Klassen beruflicher Schulen: 
Förderung von kognitiven und affektiven Zielen [VaKE (Values and Knowledge Eduation): A 
measure for integrating values education in domain specific lessons in heterogeneous classes in 
Heinrichs, Kärner & Reinke	
 
45 | F L R  
vocational schools: Fostering cognitive and affective goals]. In K. Heinrichs & H. Reinke (Eds), 
Heterogenität in der beruflichen Bildung. Im Spannungsfeld von Erziehung, Förderung und 
Fachausbildung (S. 181–194). Reihe Wirtschaft – Beruf – Ethik. Bielefeld: wbv. 
 
Appendix  
Hypothetical situations for the assessment of moral decision-making 
[Introduction for the participants] The following section shows various descriptions of situations. We 
would like to ask you to read through these situations carefully and to imagine yourself in the described 
situations. There are always exactly two alternative actions. Please decide in favour of one of them by 
marking the appropriate alternative with a cross. Afterwards, you will be asked to give reasons for your 
decision. Please indicate the main reasons in any case. In the end, you will be asked how you would 
have felt by acting as stated in each case. 
 
Situation 1—Travel Costs 
Please imagine the following situation: 
You are working for a large international company and attend a national meeting within the framework 
of your employment company. Accidentally, a friend hast to go to the same city as you do. He offers to 
give you a ride. You accept his offer willingly. During the return journey, you have a nice chat. Nobody 
from your company knows or has noticed that you didn’t take your own car, and therefore have no 
expenses of your own. The travel expenses for this journey would be 50 euros. The formula for the 
travel expenses report says that only real travel costs are refundable. The friend can settle up his travel 
expenses himself, so that you don’t have to refund him anything. 
 
Please put yourself into this situation and decide what you would do: 
( ) You claim the travel expenses of 50 euros. 
( ) You don’t claim the travel expenses of 50 euros. 
 
Please give reasons for your decision… [these statements from participants are the basis for coding the 
mechanisms of MDS] 
 
How would you feel if you would had really acted like that? 
Please mark only one possible answer. 
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Situation 2—Change 
Please imagine the following situation: 
Due to the fact that you speak Spanish very well, you go on holiday in Spain. You have earned the 
money for your holiday by working in a factory. During a day trip by bus to a distant city, you buy a 
handmade wooden sculpture for your parents in a craft shop. It is 50 euros. You pay with a 200 euro 
bill, and leave the shop. As you count your change outside the shop, you notice that the seller has given 
you back four 50 euro bills instead of 150 euros, inadvertently. 
 
Please put yourself in this situation and decide what you would do: 
( ) You return 50 euros to the seller. 
( ) You keep the 50 euros. 
 
Please give reasons for your decision… [these statements from participants are the basis for coding the 
mechanisms of MDS] 
 
How would you feel if you would had really acted like that? 
Please mark only one possible answer. 
( ) very good ( ) rather good  ( ) rather bad  ( ) very bad 
